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ESSAY
EVOLUTIONARY THEORY AND THE
ORIGIN OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
James E. Kriet
For legal scholars, the evolution of property rights has been a
topic in search of a theory. My aim here is to draw together various
accounts (some of them largely neglected in the legal literature),
from dated to modern, and suggest a way they can be melded into a
plausible explanation of property's genesis and early development.
What results hardly amounts to a theory, but it does suggest an outline
for one. Moreover, it provides a primer on the subject, a reasonably
solid foundation for thinking and talking about the evolution of prop-
erty rights.
Harold Demsetz's Toward a Theory of Property Rights,' despite its
many well-known shortcomings, has been the "point of departure for
virtually all efforts to explain changes in property rights" since its pub-
lication some forty years ago.2 I make it my point of departure as well.
Demsetz is an economist. The thesis put forth in his article is
"that the emergence of new property rights takes place in response to
... new benefit-cost possibilities" as resource values change; 3 in other
words, property rights develop in a society when the benefits of having
t Earl Warren DeLano Professor, University of Michigan Law School. I am grateful
to Greg York, Ph.D. (Biology), M.I.T. 1998, J.D., University of Michigan 2008, for exem-
plary research assistance and constructive criticism, especially on matters of evolutionary
biology. Thanks also to the following for discussions, correspondence, references, and
comments on various draft manuscripts: John Alcock, Greg Alexander, Michael Barr, Ben
Barros, A] Brophy, Shahar Dillbary, Bob Ellickson, Lee Anne Fennell, Owen Jones, Kevin
Kerber, Frances Lewis, Carol Rose, Chris Serkin, Henry Smith, and participants in the
Gruter Institute Squaw Valley Conference, May 2007, the University of Colorado Property
Works in Progress Workshop, June 2007, and law school workshops at the University of
Alabama and Cornell University. The University of Michigan Law Library provided its
usual extraordinary assistance with source materials.
I Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REv. PAPERS &
PROC. 347 (1967).
2 Thomas W. Merrill, Introduction: The Demsetz Thesis and the Evolution of Property Rights,
31J. LEGAL STUD. S331, S331 (2002); see also id. at 8333, where Merrill lists the shortcom-
ings of Demsetz's article. We will get to them shortly.
3 Demsetz, supra note 1, at 350.
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them exceed the costs of getting them.4 As an example, Demsetz
cited anthropological studies of Native American tribes inhabiting Ca-
nada's Labrador Peninsula.5 Initially, the tribes treated hunting land
as a commons open to all tribal members, who used it for various pur-
poses, including hunting beaver for furs. For a time, the Indians'
modest needs naturally limited the rate of hunting, but matters
changed when a commercial fur trade with European settlers devel-
oped in the early 1700s. The demand for furs, the rewards from hunt-
ing, and thus the rate of hunting, increased. The run on beaver
posed a threat of scarcity. In response, the tribes developed a system
of private hunting territories that were allocated to individual families
who had the right to retaliate against trespassers. 6
It is apparent in his article that Demsetz supposed these measures
were a sufficient response to the problem of overhunting. (He was
wrong.) 7 His reasoning will sound familiar, as indeed it was. He
based his analysis on the economics of common ownership, the details
of which were well understood at least a half-century before Demsetz
wrote.8 When a resource is held in common, any commoner who ex-
4 See, e.g., id. at 350 (asserting that property rights develop when the gains thus
achieved become larger than the costs thus entailed); id. at 353 (discussing "the value and
cost of establishing" property rights). While Demsetz argued that costs and benefits af-
fected the development of property rights, he believed that community preferences also
had an impact, especially as to the "form" of the rights. Id. at 350, 354. He pictured three
"idealized forms of ownership"-communal, private, and state. Id. at 354. He took the
first to be ownership by all members of a community and the last to mean ownership by a
governing authority, such as the state, a village, and so forth. As to private ownership, he
usually took it to mean ownership by a single individual, in severalty.
5 See Demsetz, supra note 1, at 351 n.3 (citing Eleanor Leacock, The Montagnais
"Hunting Territory" and the Fur Trade, Am. ANTHROPOLOGIST, Oct. 1954, at 1). As Demsetz
noted, Leacock was in essence building upon, and to some extent disagreeing with, an
earlier work, Frank C. Speck, Basis of American Indian Ownership of the Land, OLD PENN
WKuLY. REV., Jan. 16, 1915, at 491.
6 Demsetz, supra note 1, at 351-53. Regarding trespass, Demsetz misread the evi-
dence. Leacock's memoir emphasized that trespass meant one thing only, namely an in-
trusion arising "when hunting for meat or fur to sell.... [A] man finding himself in need
of food on another's land may kill the beaver-even all the beavers in a lodge-although
he cannot kill them to sell the fur." Leacock, supra note 5, at 2 (footnote omitted). Notice
the perverse incentive that resulted from this narrow prohibition on trespass: tribe mem-
bers could use their own hunting territories to hunt beaver for sale and use their neigh-
bors' hunting territories to hunt beaver for private consumption.
7 See THRAINN EGGERTSSON, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONs 251-52 (1990)
(discussing John C. McManus, An Economic Analysis of Indian Behavior in the North American
Fur Trade, 32J. EcoN. HIST. 36 (1972)). McManus learned from historians of the fur trade
"that beaver populations were sharply reduced after the introduction of the fur trade into
an area," McManus, supra, at 39, and that the Hudson Bay Company, the only buyer of furs
for a time, had to take its own measures to conserve the beaver population, id. at 46. He
attributed the overhunting of beaver, in part, to the narrow prohibition on trespass dis-
cussed supra note 6, which, in his view, had been adopted to provide a form of social
insurance against threats of starvation. Id. at 51.
8 See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property
Rights, 31J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S457 n.9 (2002) (noting that the "problem of overuse char-
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ploits the resource gains all the benefits of doing so for himself,
whereas the costs spill over onto everybody. In contrast, individual
rights, where each member of the community is entitled to a separate
resource packet, to the exclusion of other members, concentrates
costs and benefits and thus creates constructive incentives. Anyone
who decides to use his packet in a given way reaps the benefits but also
bears the costs, which are equal to the value of opportunities forgone
by exploitation as opposed to conservation.
What Demsetz added to this understanding was a fuller apprecia-
tion of the economies realized by individual ownership. 9 Notice that
even with individual shares-for example, separate parcels of land-it
is still unlikely that all the costs of any owner's uses will thereby be felt
exclusively by him. Suppose there is a community of n individuals,
each owning his own parcel of land. A might use his property in a way
that affects the property of some neighbors, say by building a dam that
causes a stream on his land to flood the lands of B and C but not the
land of anyone else. A does not feel the brunt of the flooding directly,
as he would were the dam to end up submerging his own parcel, but A
can be made to feel it through a process of negotiations whereby B
and C offer him inducements to stop using his land in a way that
floods theirs. Demsetz's distinctive contribution was to demonstrate
how individual holdings reduce the transaction costs of the negotia-
tion process by reducing the number of people who have to negotiate.
If the land were held in common, then all n commoners would have
to deal with each other, whereas with individual holdings, the negotia-
tions are confined to A, B, and C.10 Such bargaining would bring
home to A the costs that his activities impose on others, transforming
acteristic of a commons was first systematically studied" in 1911, citing literature). But one
can go back much further, to Aristotle and Aquinas, for instance, both of whom under-
stood that common ownership promotes not just overuse of the resource in question but
also underproduction. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, bk. 2, pt. 5, at 1262-64 (Trevor J.
Saunders trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1995) (c. 350 B.C.); 2 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEO-
LOGICA, Ila, IIae, Q. 66, art, 2 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., 2d & rev.
ed. 1920) (c. 1265-74).
9 Demsetz's argument built on R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & ECON. 1
(1960), which demonstrated that in the absence of transaction costs, all spillover effects of
an activity will be taken into account through negotiations among the affected parties.
10 Hume seems to have anticipated Demsetz's point by several centuries. See DAVID
HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, bk. 3, pt. 2, § 7, at 538 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford
Univ. Press 2d ed. 1978) (1740):
Two neighbours may agree to drain a meadow, which they possess in com-
mon; because 'tis easy for them to know each others mind; and each must
perceive, that the immediate consequence of his failing in his part, is, the
abandoning the whole project. But 'tis very difficult, and indeed impossi-
ble, that a thousand persons shou'd agree in any such action; it being diffi-
cult for them to concert so complicated a design, and still more difficult for
them to execute it; while each seeks a pretext to free himself of the trouble
and expence, and wou'd lay the whole burden on others.
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the costs to them into an opportunity cost to him that he would com-
pare to the benefits he stood to realize were he to continue in his
ways."1
In contrast to his careful explanation of the manner in which in-
dividual property rights reduce transaction costs, Demsetz said little
about the process by which the rights might originate. He supposed
that they result from "gradual changes in social mores and in com-
mon law precedents," themselves to some degree the product of "legal
and moral experiments"-"hit-and-miss procedures" that select in
favor of cost-minimizing approaches, at least in societies that place a
premium on efficiency.' 2
II
Here is a summary of Demsetz's account and its problems:
Demsetz was explicit about the cost-benefit criterion for change in
property rights, offered a sophisticated account of the benefits of
property, and included one compelling illustration of his thesis.
But the article said nothing about the factors that determine the
costs of a property regime. It said virtually nothing about the pre-
cise mechanism by which a society determines that the benefits of
property exceed the costs, other than to disclaim any position on
whether this would necessarily entail a "conscious endeavor." And it
said virtually nothing about the form that emergent property rights
are likely to take, other than to observe that whether a society
adopts private property or state-owned property may turn in part on
the "community's tastes" for collectivism. 1 3
11 I note in passing the oddness of Demsetz citing the development of Indian hunting
territories as a relevant example of his argument. Those hunting territories were held by
families, not single individuals, and family ownership could give rise to high transaction
costs even if the owners were few in number, thanks especially to opportunistic behavior
(freeriders, holdouts) that provokes costly haggling, as in bilateral monopoly situations.
This is why modern property law grants tenants in common and joint tenants the unilateral
right to partition their holdings and convert them into ownership in severalty. In this
connection, a close reading of the anthropological evidence cited by Demsetz suggests that
the family territories were eventually partitioned off to individual family members-per-
haps for the reasons just suggested. See Leacock, supra note 5, at 1 (noting that there was
"continual readjustment of band lands to fit the needs of band members. Each Indian has
a right to trapping lands of his own. . . ." (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)). That the
hunting territories were, prior to partition, a commons, though one limited to family mem-
bers (which could be few or many), might be another reason the beaver stock was
overhunted, as discussed supra note 7.
12 Demsetz, supra note 1, at 350. In a later article, Demsetz asserted that "a right-
defining and conflict-resolving institution, such as the court system, the legislature, or
some community authority, is inevitably part of any property right system." Harold Dem-
setz, Property Rights, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAw 144,
144 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
13 Merrill, supra note 2, at S333 (quoting Demsetz, supra note 1, at 350).
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With all these shortcomings, Demsetz's argument would seem to
contribute little to understanding the evolution of property rights.
But, it now appears, Demsetz never had any such aim in mind when
he wrote Toward a Theory of Property Rights. Recently (less than a year
ago as I write this), Demsetz said that he had not claimed to view
changes in property rights (or social change in general) "as an evolu-
tionary process."' 4 Rather, he had sought only to suggest a positive
theory that property rights develop in response to costs and benefits, t 5
choosing to "avoid the different, difficult problem of how property
right adjustments are actually made."' 6
III
Even if Toward a Theory of Property Rights has little if any theory
about the evolution of property rights, it can be used to illuminate the
subject. First, though, I want to establish a clear understanding of
what the subject is. The literature regularly uses "property rights,"
"evolution," and "evolutionary theory" as if their meanings were un-
ambiguous and shared by all, which they are not, resulting in an un-
necessary muddle. So let me specify exactly what I take the key terms
to mean.
"Property rights." Begin with two assertions made by Jeremy Ben-
tham. First: "The idea of property consists in an established expecta-
tion; in the persuasion of being able to draw such or such an
advantage from the thing possessed, according to the nature of the
case." And second: "Now this expectation, this persuasion, can only
be the work of law."' 17
For purposes of constructing an evolutionary account, we have to
define property rights in a way that accepts Bentham's first statement
but rejects his second one. The second statement has to be rejected
simply because property rights, in the sense of Bentham's "established
expectations," emerged thousands of years before the existence of any
14 Harold Demsetz, Frischmann's View of "Toward a Theory of Property Rights", 4 REv. L. &
ECON. 127, 128 (2008). I thank Brett Frischmann for calling this item to my attention.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 129. It is strange that Demsetz waited so long to set the record straight. He
had a perfect opportunity to do so at a 2001 conference convened particularly to reexam-
ine Toward a Theory of Property Rights. The title of the conference was "The Evolution of
Property Rights." Conference papers were subsequently published in Symposium, The
Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S331 (2002). Virtually all of the papers take
Demsetz's article as an evolutionary account. Demsetz himself participated in the confer-
ence and contributed a paper. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights II: The
Competition Between Private and Collective Ownership, 31J. LEGAL STUD. S653 (2002). Nowhere
in that paper did he comment on the misapprehensions of his work.
17 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 112 (Richard Hildreth trans., 1975)
(1802); see also id. at 113 ("Property and law are born together, and die together. Before
laws were made there was no property; take away laws, and property ceases.").
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"law."18 Primitive property rights were de facto, not dejure. The fea-
ture that defined them as de facto property rights, as opposed to de
facto some-other-sort-of rights, is that they concerned assets from
which possessors (owners) could choose to exclude others with the
expectation that those others would respect that choice. Probably
there were often situations in which several co-owners shared posses-
sion; in such cases, any co-owner could exclude any nonowner, but
not other co-owners. Still, though, the co-owned possession would be
private property because of the right of the co-owners to exclude non-
owners. This stands in contrast to an open-access commons (as in the
state of nature, a universal commons), where all may use the resource
and none may exclude others. If nobody has a right to exclude, there
is no property.
Demsetz, recall, talked in terms of "communal" property, which
he described as property belonging to all members of a given commu-
nity.19 An ambiguity thus arises. If, as is likely, Demsetz thought that
members of a given community would not aim to exclude each other
in such a case but would aim to exclude members of other communi-
ties, then there would be what is called, in modern parlance, a limited-
access commons (maybe not limited very much, but nevertheless lim-
ited). Demsetz made no mention of such a commons, apparently not
noticing that his example of a tribal system of family allotments
amounted to such. For him there was communal property belonging
to all, private property belonging to a single individual, and state
property belonging to the government. This is clumsy not only be-
cause it overlooks the limited-access commons, but also because it im-
plies that private property is conterminous with individual ownership
when it obviously is not. As Carol Rose has nicely put it, a limited-
access commons is common on the inside, but private on the
outside2 0-the former because co-owners may not be excluded, the
18 See, e.g., SAMUEL BOWLES, MICROECONOMics: BEHAVIOR, INSITTIONS, AND EVOLU-
TION (2004). Bowles points out that individual claims on property preceded the develop-
ment of agriculture about eleven millennia ago and became more extensive thereafter; the
rights "emerged and proliferated without the assistance of states or other centralized en-
forcement agencies." Id. at 382. Many thousands of years later, "centralized forms of pun-
ishment and enforcement of property rights began to emerge as a new form of
organization." Id.
19 See discussion supra note 4.
20 See Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission
Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 155 (1998) (referring to "commons on the
inside, property on the outside"). This usage is consistent with everyday lay usage. Sup-
pose you and I own Ouracre as tenants in common. Is it not our private property? And so
too if we join with twenty more, or one hundred, or one thousand? Still, some property
scholars subscribe to a view that "private property" refers only to ownership by "one person
or a small number of persons." See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude,
77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 733 (1998) (using that definition). I regard this as not quite correct,
[Vol. 95:139
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latter because nonowners may be excluded. Private property is inclu-
sive of individual property, but the converse does not hold.
None of the foregoing should be taken to suggest that property
rights are limited to the feature of exclusion (hardly), but exclusion is
enough to get us started. 21 We can picture an exclusion continuum
running from a single owner to a few co-owners to many co-owners of
the right to exclude from some given possession. The greater the
number of co-owners of a resource, the more likely the resource will
suffer the mismanagement and undue exploitation characteristic of
an open-access commons.
"Evolution" and "evolutionary theory." As any dictionary will con-
firm, "evolution" is a term with many meanings.2 2 It refers, in the
most general sense, to a process of gradual change, and it goes with-
out saying that property rights have, in this sense, evolved. Primitive
rights emerged at some point, and they were followed eventually by
developments that culminated in the full-blown property systems of
modern times. A project that merely described the course of events
would be an evolutionary study of sorts and would no doubt provide
fodder for an evolutionary theory, but it would not amount to one.
An evolutionary theory of property rights aims to provide a plausible
explanation of their genesis and development, given whatever evi-
dence we might happen to have.
There are at least two very different types of evolutionary ac-
counts that might be used to explain the emergence of property
rights. One type views property as the product of intentional under-
takings: property is "designed." The other type sees property as an
unintended consequence of individual actions: property arises "spon-
taneously." To account for property in the latter manner is to present
an invisible-hand explanation, which "explains what looks to be the
product of someone's intentional design, as not being brought about
by anyone's intentions."23 This definition does not exclude all inten-
tions but only any intention to achieve the particular developments in
though I suppose it matters little so long as everybody agrees on what everybody is talking
about. But, as I have already suggested, everybody does not; hence the muddle.
21 On the centrality of the exclusion right to the conception of property, see, for
example, Merrill, supra note 20 passim.
22 See, e.g., 5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARv 476-77 (2d ed. 1989) (indicating sixteen
meanings within three general significative categories).
23 ROBERT NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 19 (1974); see also BOWLES, supra note
18, at 57 (using the same terminology). Nozick cited a number of examples of invisible-
hand explanations, most of which would be unfamiliar to legal scholars. SeeNoziCK, supra,
at 20-21. An example he did not provide, but which might be familiar, is the body of
literature arguing that common law rules are pushed in the direction of efficiency because
inefficient rules are litigated more often than efficient ones, thus increasing the probability
that the inefficient rules will be filtered out over time. For discussion and criticism, see
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 604 (7th ed. 2007).
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question.24 Adam Smith long ago highlighted the distinction in The
Wealth of Nations when he spoke of a marketplace where every individ-
ual "intends only his own gain," yet is "led by an invisible hand to
promote an end which was no part of his intention."25
The most familiar evolutionary account of the invisible-hand type
is Darwin's theory of the origin of species. 26 (The point of view op-
posed to it is an intentional-design type of account, aptly named Intel-
ligent Design.) 27  But evolutionary explanation is not limited to
prehistoric events, much less to biological phenomena. For example,
the literature on the contemporary development of property rights
uses both types of evolutionary accounts. 28 Usually government plays
some role in these accounts; however, I want to focus on the emer-
gence of property many millennia before the state and other govern-
mental institutions themselves emerged (thus belying Bentham's
assertion that the existence of a legal system is essential to the exis-
tence of a property system) .29 Because property began in prehistoric
times, no one can really prove what actually happened, as a matter of
historical truth. The objective is a plausible explanation that is logi-
cally intact and consistent with what we know about human
development.
IV
It is a strange thing about Toward a Theory of Property Rights. For
forty-plus years readers take it to be an evolutionary account, then its
author says it is not. Critics complain that the article fails to explain
24 See, e.g., Jack Hirshleifer, Evolutionary Models in Economics and Law: Cooperation Versus
Conflict Strategies, 4 Res. L. & ECON. 1, 10 (1982) ("The inventor of the bow had an inten-
tion, but it was only to help himself or his band; the spread of a new technique of hunting
... was surely beyond his purpose.").
25 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 423 (Edwin Cannan ed., Random House
1937) (1776); see also, e.g., Robert Sugden, Spontaneous Order, in THE NEW PALGAVE DiC-
TIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, supra note 12, at 485, 493 (contrasting "individual
motivation and unintended collective consequence").
26 See CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES BY MEANS OF NATURAL SELECTION
(6th rev. ed. 1888).
27 See PERCIVAL DAVIS & DEAN H. KENYON, OF PANDAS AND PEOPLE: THE CENTRAL
QUESTION OF BIOLOGICAL ORIGINS (1989), for the first comprehensive (and controversial)
account of Intelligent Design in a high-school textbook explaining the origin of new
organisms.
28 See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DIS-
PUTES (1991) (discussing the governance of relations among neighboring cattle ranchers
by reference to informal norms and developing a theory of norm formation); Richard A.
Epstein, The Allocation of the Commons: Parking on Public Roads, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S515,
S528-33 (2002) (discussing the spontaneous emergence of snow-parking property rights in
contemporary Chicago); Katrina Miriam Wyman, From Fur to Fish: Reconsidering the Evolution
of Private Property, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 117 (2005) (presenting a case study that takes account
of the role of government and the political process in the development of property rights).
29 See supra text accompanying note 17.
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how property rights emerge; Demsetz says he chose to avoid that diffi-
cult matter altogether, aiming only to suggest why property rights
emerge. The article itself is ambiguous, consistent with each point of
view. I want to highlight what Demsetz seems to have said about the
evolutionary question of how, because doing so lets us explore the dis-
tinction between the two types of evolutionary accounts-intentional
design and unintended consequences.
Intentional design. Bits and pieces of Demsetz's argument can be
reasonably taken to suggest that he was thinking about an evolution-
ary account based on intentional design. His thesis that property
rights develop in response to changes in costs and benefits seems to
refer to a process whereby some centralized agency sums up social
costs and benefits, then chooses the most efficient property rights ar-
rangement, subject to "a community's preferences for private owner-
ship."30 The process might be "hit-and-miss" to some degree and
involve "legal and moral experiments, ' 31 but "inevitably" there is a
purposeful and authoritative designer in the picture.3 2
Unintended consequences. Other bits and pieces of Demsetz's argu-
ment point in the direction of an unintended-consequences (invisible-
hand) type of account. For example, he thought that changes in
property rights in response to changes in costs and benefits need not
be "the result of a conscious endeavor"; instead, the process could
involve "gradual changes in social mores" that occur without some
particular end in mind and entail no central authority.33 Moreover,
individual practices, rather than collective choices, could be the
source of changes in property rights. 34 Demsetz mentioned an exam-
ple involving hunters, each of whom marked the territory he regularly
used as his own in order to give notice of his claim-presumably with
the expectation that others would respect it. 3 5 He discussed another
example involving portable personal items (weapons, pottery, and
other utensils) that-because they took time and effort to produce,
were useful, and could be easily protected by keeping them close at
hand-were recognized as private property in primitive societies, sim-
ply as a matter of social practice. 36
Now we can take a closer look at the two types of evolutionary
accounts and see how they figure in the literature.
30 Demsetz, supra note 1, at 350.
31 See supra text accompanying note 12.
32 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
33 Demsetz, supra note 1, at 350.
34 See id. (asserting that changes in property rights result from "the desires of the
interacting persons").
35 Id. at 352.
36 Id. at 353 n.7.
2009]
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Begin with intentional design. As Richard Dawkins has pointed
out, a central difficulty with evolutionary explanations based on de-
sign is that they invite "an inevitable regression to the problem of the
origin of the designer. '3 7 So how did commoners living in a state of
nature with open access to resources and no government manage, in
the first instance, to set up a property system? This is a crucial ques-
tion in accounts based on design. Simply asserting that commoners
self-consciously cooperated in the development of property regimes
does not answer it, nor does assuming that central authorities of some
sort imposed property regimes. 38 The first assertion, self-conscious co-
operation, begs the question because it is the absence of cooperation
that was the problem to begin with, brought on, as Demsetz demon-
strated, by high transaction costs. Taking it as a given that property
rights, individual rights in particular, reduce transaction costs once the
rights are in place, the fact remains that the same bothersome transac-
tion costs must be confronted in order to get the rights in place by
means of cooperation. 9 Hence just how cooperation was achieved
needs to be explained. But this, of course, Demsetz did not do.
Much the same can be said of the second assertion, centralized
intervention by some sort of governing authority.40 How did the au-
thority come into being, absent cooperation and collective action?41
Readers who take Demsetz's account as an evolutionary explana-
tion based on intentional design criticize it on just the grounds
sketched above, and give similar treatment to later works written in a
Demsetzian vein. The charge is that the approach assumes away the
crucial problems of collective action and of accounting for the pres-
ence of government. 42 One proposed methodological solution to this
37 RICHARD DAWKINS, THE ANCESTOR'S TALE: A PILGRIMAGE TO THE DAWN OF EVOLU-
TION 602 (2004).
38 Unless, of course, the account obviously takes for granted the existence of the de-
signer and is interested only in how things developed from there on. A study of how the
Federal Communications Commission allocates spectrum would not be rightly criticized
for failing to explain how the Commission came to be created, how the authority that
created it came to be authorized, etc.
39 See, e.g.,James E. Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons, Part Two, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'v 325, 337-39 (1992).
40 "Kicking [the problem] upstairs," to use Carol Rose's nice expression. See Carol M.
Rose, Evolution of Property Rights, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND
THE LAW, supra note 12, at 93, 94.
41 A governing authority might have come into power by force, but still the collective
action problem persists; the challenge becomes one of explaining how any group managed
to organize itself into a force.
42 See, e.g., Stuart Banner, Transitions Between Property Regimes, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S359,
S362 n.8 (2002) (collecting citations); Krier, supra note 39, at 338 n.44 (collecting cita-
tions); see also EGGERTSSON, supra note 7, at 254 (discussing the failure of various accounts
to "deal with the free-riding problems that plague group decision"); id. at 250 (finding this
[Vol. 95:139
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problem, developed over the last several decades, works up from the
idea that small, close-knit groups have advantages in overcoming ob-
stacles to constructive collective action. Group members are relatively
few in number, known to each other, share common interests, and
interact repeatedly. These features facilitate cooperation, whether in
the formation of property norms by group decision or by group dele-
gation to a central authority itself created by group decision. 43 It is
likely by this means that individuals moved out of the state of nature
and into increasingly centralized levels of organization, eventuating,
after many millennia, in modern government-the ultimate designer.
More on this later.
Demsetz's account in Toward a Theory of Property Rights has been
likened to the much earlier views (seventeenth century) of Thomas
Hobbes and John Locke.44 Carol Rose, for example, has said that
Demsetz took their story and "told it once again,"4 5 and this is, to
some degree, certainly so. Their story, much like his, began with an
initial situation of open access to a common stock of natural re-
sources, no ownership, and no civil government. Hobbes figured that
any commoner taking a thing out of the stock would thereafter treat it
as his own but would have to stand ready to defend his possessions
against grabbing by intruders. Commoners might try to enhance the
security of their holdings by making contracts among themselves,
promising not to interfere with the possessions of others so long as
others promised the same in return, but self-help was the only means
of restraining promisors from reneging (and think of the transaction
costs!). Hence, Hobbes concluded, life would be marked by ongoing
battles.46 Locke agreed. His labor theory dictated that anything taken
from the commons rightly belonged to the taker, "at least where there
is enough, and as good left in common for others, '4 7 but he conceded
a characteristic feature of the "naive theory of property rights," which "seek[s] to explain
the development of exclusive property rights without explicitly modeling social and politi-
cal institutions. Demsetz's 1967 paper . . . is the classic reference for the naive theory of
property rights." (emphasis omitted)); ITAI SENED, THE POLITICAL INSTITUTION OF PRIVATE
PROPERTY 16 (1997) (observing that the flaw is typical of social contract accounts); id. at
34-48 (discussing examples).
43 See Rose, supra note 40, at 95 (referring to the argument and noting some of the
leading literature).
44 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Michael Oakeshott ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1960)
(1651); JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1960) (1690).
45 Rose, supra note 40, at 94.
46 HOBBES, supra note 44, ch. 13, at 81-84.
47 LOCKE, supra note 44, bk. 2, § 27, at 306; see also id. bk. 2, § 28, at 307 ("'[T]is the
taking any part of what is common, and removing it out of the state Nature leaves it in,
which begins the Property .... "). Locke's view is reflected in the rule of capture familiar to
modern property law, according to which wild animals in their natural condition belong to
the first person to kill them, capture them in hand, trap them, or mortally wound them.
See, e.g., Pierson v. Post, 3 Cal. 175, 179 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). The dissent in Pierson argued
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that commoners might regularly disregard this principle, with a "State
of Wa9' being the likely consequence. 48  Hobbes and Locke both
thought that the only solution was some sort of governing authority
arising by mutual agreement among all (the fanciful "social
contract") .49
Although Demsetz's account is similar in a few respects to the
views of Hobbes and Locke, it has one important difference that can
easily go unnoticed. Hobbes and Locke pictured a world of ongoing
battles over possessions, absent the invention and intervention of gov-
ernment. In contrast, in parts of his article, Demsetz seemed to envi-
sion a norm of respect for possession that emerged on its own and
went forth without enforcement. Several instances were mentioned
earlier,50 and another lurks in the logic of Demsetz's argument. Im-
plicit in his discussion is the assumption that any commoner who took
from the standing resource stock thereby acquired an individual right
to the thing taken, with everybody acting accordingly. Individuals re-
garded resources as common while in place, but as private once sev-
ered.51 Why might people have behaved like that?
VI
Consider an invisible-hand answer to the question, one with its
own distinguished forbear. In A Treatise of Human Nature, David
Hume introduced the idea of behavioral "conventions" 52 that arise
spontaneously from "a general sense of common interest; which sense
all the members of the society express to one another, and which in-
duces them to regulate their conduct by certain rules .... [T] he ac-
tions of each of us have a reference to those of the other, and are
perform'd upon the supposition, that something is to be perform'd
for an alternative rule whereby ownership would vest in the first person to pursue with a
reasonable prospect of capture, id. at 182, and Locke might well have agreed. See LOCKE,
supra note 44, bk. 2, § 30, at 308 ("[T]he Hare that any one is Hunting, is thought his who
pursues her during the Chase. For being a Beast that is still looked upon as common....
whoever has imploy'd so much labourabout any of that kind, as to find and pursue her, has
thereby removed her from the state of Nature, wherein she was common, and hath begun a
Property.").
48 LocKE, supra note 44, bk. 2, § 17, at 297.
49 HOBBES, supra note 44, ch. 15, at 94 (need for a governing authority), ch. 18, at
109-13 (governing authority established by mutual agreement), ch. 18, at 112 (power of
governing authority to make and enforce rules); LocKE, supra note 44, §§ 18-20, at
297-300 (need for a governing authority), § 211, at 424 (governing authority established
by mutual agreement), § 222, at 430 (power of governing authority to make "Rules set as
Guards and Fences to the Properties of all the Members of the Society").
50 See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
51 Demsetz had to assume such a practice or his argument would have lost its anchor.
If sharing persisted after severance, incentives to overwork the common stock-a central
premise in the logic of Demsetz's account-would be much reduced, replaced by the prob-
lem of shirking in the maintenance of the common resources.
52 HUME, supra note 10, bk. 3, pt. 2, § 2, at 490.
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on the other part."53 Today we speak of a convention as a social prac-
tice generally adhered to by the members of a particular social group
without any explicit agreement or external enforcement, thanks to a
general expectation that the practice will be followed. This expecta-
tion is one of the reasons any individual follows the practice, such that
the practice is taken by all to reflect a shared understanding or im-
plicit agreement.54 Hume's view, thus understood, anticipated much
later developments in modem game theory,55 in which conventions
are "mutual best response outcomes that are sustained by the fact that
virtually all players believe that virtually all other players will best
respond."56
With respect to property rights and rights of individual ownership
in particular, Hume saw them as the remedy to problems of exploita-
tion. Without property rights, whatever anyone gathered, grew, or
built would be vulnerable "to the violence of others, ' 57 but all the
while it would be in the interest of each person "to leave another in
the possession of his goods, provided he will act in the same manner
with regard to me." s58 So there might develop "a convention enter'd
into by all the members of the society to bestow stability on the posses-
sion of... external goods, and leave every one in the peaceable enjoy-
ment of what he may acquire by his fortune and industry."59 The
convention, Hume said, "arises gradually, and acquires force by a slow
progression, and by our repeated experience of the inconveniences of
transgressing it.' '60
Hume thought that animals (humans aside) "are incapable of...
property."61 Biologists say otherwise. They observe that members of
many species-various spiders, insects, birds, and mammals, for exam-
ple-commonly resolve territorial disputes by a simple rule: the resi-
53 Id.
54 See Robert Sugden, Conventions, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAvE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS
AND THE LAW, supra note 12, at 453, 454.
55 See SENED, supra note 42, at 19 ("Hume's logical analysis preceded by two centuries
similar contemporary game theoretic arguments. ... ). Sened probably had in mind
evolutionary game theory in particular. Evolutionary game theory is an instance of non-
cooperative game theory; it focuses on the formation of norms and conventions, meaning
patterns of behavior that emerge spontaneously and are self-enforcing. For a quick over-
view, see George J. Mailath, Evolutionary Game Theory, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVW DICTIONARY
OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, supra note 12, at 84, 84. As applied to humans, the approach
"stresses rule-of-thumb behaviors that are updated by a backward-looking learning process,
that is, in light of one's own or others' recent experience." BOWLES, supra note 18, at 33. It
assumes that individuals are boundedly rational but not quite so cognitively gifted as the
people who populate classical game theory.
56 BOWLES, supra note 18, at 43.
57 HUME, supra note 10, bk. 3, pt. 2, § 2, at 487-88.
58 Id. at 490.
59 Id. at 489.
60 Id. at 490.
61 Id. bk. 2, pt. 1, § 12, at 326.
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dent always wins. 62 The rule, deference to possession, is a product of
biological evolution, and the core explanation of why and how it de-
veloped is usually credited to the biologist John Maynard Smith, who
summarized and extended his views in Evolution and the Theory of
Games.63 Here, in simplified form, is his explanation:
Picture a situation in which two conspecifics (members of the
same species) are drawn to a particular breeding territory with a value
v equal to the gain in reproductive fitness realized by the animal that
ends up with that territory rather than with a less favorable alternative.
Either animal might, with equal probability, arrive first and be a pos-
sessor or second and be an intruder. And either animal will be either
an aggressive type called Hawk or a passive type called Dove. Hawks
fight until one is injured and retreats to less favorable territory, and in
any Hawk-Hawk contest the animals have equal chances of winning or
being injured. (Injury carries a cost c measured in terms of reduced
reproductive fitness.) As to Doves, they may engage in preliminary
bluffing but never engage in fights; hence, they avoid injury but end
up losing territory to Hawks and sharing it with Doves. 64 On these
assumptions, and remembering that in any contest between two
Hawks each has a fifty percent chance of injury, the payoffs (for the
row players) are as shown below:
H D
H '/2 (v-c) v
D 0 v/2
Beginning with some random mix of conspecifics, how might nat-
ural selection lead the animals to behave? It depends. If v > c, Hawk-
ish behavior is the winner because any expected fitness losses are
more than offset by expected fitness gains (1/2(v-c) > 0), making the
risk of injury worthwhile. Suppose, however, that v < c, so that fight-
ing is a losing proposition. Maynard Smith demonstrated that what
might evolve is a hybrid Bourgeois type that acts consistently as
neither Hawk nor Dove, but instead behaves in accord with a new
rule: "'if owner, play Hawk; if intruder, play Dove.'"65 So long as v < c,
62 See generally Hanna Kokko et al., From Hawks and Doves to Self-Consistent Games of
Territorial Behavior, 167 AM. NATURALIST 901, 901 (2006) ("The animal kingdom provides
countless examples of the 'prior-residence effect'...."). For a very accessible introductory
discussion, see JOHN ALCOCK, ANIMAL BEHAVIOR: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH 264-73 (8th
ed. 2005).
63 JOHN MAYNARD SMITH, EVOLUTION AND THE THEORY OF GAMES (1982). Much of
Maynard Smith's discussion in the book owes to earlier work by him and others dating
back several decades.
64 Id. at 11-12.
65 Id. at 22.
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animals that happen to behave according to the Bourgeois strategy
(protecting what they possess and deferring to those in possession)
fare better than they would by behaving any other way;6 6 they "avoid
more damaging encounters than the pure Hawks and win more en-
counters than pure Doves."'67 Hence the strategy can proliferate until,
eventually, it characterizes the behavior of the entire population. At
that point, Bourgeois is an "evolutionarily stable strategy" (ESS),68
meaning "a strategy such that, if all the members of a population
adopt it, then no mutant strategy could invade the population under
the influence of natural selection. '69
The evolution of the Bourgeois strategy depends on the asymme-
try of possessor and intruder, an observable characteristic that signals
to a contestant the role-Hawk or Dove-likely to be played by an
opponent, such that the contestant can behave in light of the informa-
tion the signal provides. It is not necessary, however, that being an
occupant confer any actual advantage in defending territory. All that
matters is that the asymmetry between possessor and intruder "is
unambiguously perceived by both contestants. ' 70 Where that condi-
tion holds, the rule of "deference to possessors" can develop and per-
sist simply as the consequence of utterly self-interested individual
action. 71
66 Maynard Smith's analysis and conclusions, given his assumptions, appear to be un-
contested. For the mathematical details of his treatment, see id. at 11-23, 94-96; Hirsh-
leifer, supra note 24, at 20-24.
67 Chris Meredith, Tit for Tat, http://www.abc.net.au/science/slab/tittat/story.htm
(last visited Sept. 7, 2009).
68 MAYNARD SMITH, supra note 63, at 23 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
69 Id. at 10.
70 Id. at 23. In a case where possession of a territory does confer an actual advantage
in defending it, or where possessors are commonly larger or stronger, the asymmetry is
said to be correlated. "An uncorrelated strategy can be evolutionarily stable even when
there is a correlated strategy also available." Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Property "Instinct", 359
PHIL. TRANSACTIONS: BIOLOGICAL SCl. 1763, 1764 (2004) (citing Peter Hammerstein, The
Role of Asymmetries in Animal Contests, 29 ANIMAL BEHAV. 193 (1981)). Moreover, a strategy
might be correlated early on-because possession is sometimes a defensive advantage, or
because stronger individuals generally appear as first occupants-yet become uncorrelated
later on, as the mere fact of possession becomes a proxy for advantages that in fact no
longer hold.
Just as the Bourgeois strategy is an ESS, so is its opposite-if possessor, play Dove, if
intruder, play Hawk. This ESS is regarded as "paradoxical" because evolutionary theory
would seem to rule it out. Animals behaving in anti-Bourgeois fashion would end up con-
stantly moving around, looking for territory and occupying it, only to be quickly displaced.
There would be no time for breeding. Maynard Smith was aware of the problem (and of
the case of a type of spider that seems to exhibit the paradoxical strategy). See MAYNARD
SMITH, supra note 63, at 96-97. A resolution of the paradox is suggested by Kokko et al.,
supra note 62, at 909.
71 Maynard Smith's model shows that the Bourgeois strategy can evolve, not that it
invariably will. See Hirshleifer, supra note 24, at 23 (asserting that the development of the
strategy depends on individuals "able to distinguish between owner and interloper situa-
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Social scientists familiar with game theory were quick to notice
the relationship between Maynard Smith's analysis and Hume's no-
tion of conventions. A notable example is the work of the economist
Robert Sugden. 72 He altered Maynard Smith's model to fit the
human context-namely by "substituting a subjective concept of util-
ity for Darwinian fitness as the measure of success," and by "assuming
that more successful strategies [conventions, in Hume's terms] sup-
plant less successful ones by a process of imitation and learning rather
than by one of biological natural selection." 73 In the biological
model, behavior is genetically predetermined. In the human model,
it is consciously chosen, but individually--by any actor given his or her
utility and given the expected behavior of others-not collectively
(whether by agreement among the members of a group, or by a cen-
tral authority on behalf of others). Hume supposed, contrary to Hob-
bes and Locke, that individual choice could lead to group harmony,
even in the face of self-interest. Sugden aimed to show, in rigorously
logical terms, that Hume was correct, at least as to property rights. He
rested his argument on the Hawk-Dove-Bourgeois game74 and
reached conclusions much like those of Maynard Smith. Repeated
play would likely lead to a convention-a de facto property rule-of
deference to possessors. 75
tions, and . . .able to execute the appropriate behavioral maneuvers of both Hawk and
Dove"). Still, Maynard Smith's analysis "shows that respect for ownership is a possible evo-
lutionary emergence that need not call upon any force other than private advantage....
On the human level, a corresponding environmental situation might be expected to lead
to a 'social ethic' supporting a system of property rights." Id. (citation omitted).
72 ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, CO-OPERATION AND WELFARE (Palgrave
Macmillan 2004) (1986). The second edition is virtually the same as the first, save for a
new Introduction and Afterword.
73 Id. at 62. Despite the substitution, Sugden believed that much of the biological
analysis "can be carried over to the human case." Id. He expanded on this point later,
noting among other things that "[s]ince so many animals do have an innate sense of pos-
session and territory, it would not be surprising if this was true for our species." Id. at 107.
To the same effect, see Jack Hirshleifer, Privacy: Its Origin, Function, and Future, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 649, 657 (1980) (suggesting that evolution may have led to a "hard-wired" defensive
attitude regarding possessions and a deferential attitude regarding the possessions of
others); Stake, supra note 70, at 1763 (arguing that humans may share a "hard-wired" prop-
erty "instinct"). Both Hirshleifer and Stake discuss the Maynard Smith model and consider
its relevance to the development of property and other rights. A commentary on Hirsh-
leifer also briefly discusses respect for possession from the standpoint of evolutionary the-
ory. See Richard A. Epstein, A Taste for Privacy? Evolution and the Emergence of a Naturalistic
Ethic, 9J. LEGAL STUD. 665, 672-73 (1980).
74 Sugden considered several other games as well (the war-of-attrition game-also
considered by Maynard Smith-the division game, and games of commitment). I omit
that part of his discussion because he found the other games led to results matching those
of the Hawk-Dove-Bourgeois game. For the curious, the relevant pages are SUGDEN, supra
note 72, at 65-86.
75 Several commentators have argued that deference to possessors might have evolved
because of an endowment effect, according to which an individual puts a systematically
higher value on something possessed than on an opportunity to possess the very same
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Sugden's contribution, the first extensive adaptation of the bio-
logical model to the human context, provided a particularly interest-
ing discussion of possession as the crucial asymmetry. Given any
number of asymmetries (the difference between a strong contestant
and a weak one, an attractive contestant and an ugly one, a loud con-
testant and a quiet one, a greedy contestant and a generous one, a
rich contestant and a needy one, and so on), why settle on possession
as the decisive factor? Sugden's answer began by noting that the point
of a convention is to guide behavior. To perform that function, the
asymmetry underlying the convention must be prominently apparent.
Hume thought possession worked well in this respect (its salience led
people to converge on it), and Sugden agreed. If the idea is to find a
way of assigning objects to people, there is, he thought, "a natural
prominence to solutions that base the assignment on some pre-ex-
isting relation between persons and objects."76 Possession is, by the
same token, usually unambiguous, and thus provides a clear indica-
tion of the status of any claimant. This makes possession cheat proof
because it cannot be feigned. No fine judgments are required, as they
would be if the asymmetry had to do with such attributes as neediness,
attractiveness, strength, and so on.77 Moreover, possession implies
some earlier expenditure of effort, some labor, by the possessor;
Sugden believed, like Locke, that labor is naturally and normally re-
garded as meritorious. 78 Finally, there is the biological evidence sug-
gesting that humans, like other animals, have some "innate sense of
possession and territory. '79
Two limitations of the unintended-consequences approach have
to be noted before we move on.
First, its explanatory power depends on a cost-benefit relationship
likely to prevail only when resources are relatively abundant. The con-
thing. See Herbert Gintis, The Evolution of Private Property, 64 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 1,
passim (2007); Stake, supra note 70, at 1767. The argument is plausible, but so is its oppo-
site. Rather than generating the convention of deference to possessors, the endowment
effect could just as well owe to it, in that deference to possession adds to the value of
possession.
76 SUGDEN, supra note 72, at 97 (discussing HUME, supra note 10, bk. 3, pt. 2, § 3, at
504 n.1: "As property forms a relation betwixt a person and an object, 'tis natural to found
it on some preceding relation .... ."). Hume extended the convention of possession to
property acquired by prescription, accession, and succession. See id. bk. 3, pt. 2, § 3, at
509-13.
77 In this connection, it is interesting to recall that the majority decision in Pierson v.
Post, discussed supra note 47, opted for first capture of a wild animal, as opposed to the
dissent's approach of first pursuit, as the act needed to give rise to ownership. The court
selected capture "for the sake of certainty," noting that the alternative of first pursuit, given
its ambiguity, "would prove a fertile source of quarrels and litigation." 3 Cai. 175, 179 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1805).
78 See SUGDEN, supra note 72, at 100-01.
79 Id. at 107; see also supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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vention of deference, recall, depends on v < c, calculated from each
individual actor's point of view.80 If resource values increased to the
point that v > c (calculated in the same fashion), the precondition for
deference would no longer be met, and the de facto regime would be
vulnerable to breakdown. Hawk would become the winning strategy
and the new equilibrium,8' resulting in a reversion to a Hobbesian
state of nature. This, at least, is the implication of high resource value
in the animal setting,82 but surely it has some application to the
human animal as well. As Hume observed, the temptation of one man
to interfere with the possessions of another "is less conspicuous, where
the possessions ... are few, and of little value, as they always are in the
infancy of society."8 3 In short, scarcity threatens breakdown of the
convention-based de facto property system, absent some third-party
enforcement authority for which the invisible-hand argument appears
not to provide.8 4
A second limitation of the unintended-consequences approach is
that it cannot account for anything beyond very simple property rules
because the asymmetries on which it depends must be crude in order
to be effective.8 5 Recall, for example, the subtle distinctions that gov-
erned rules about trespass on Indian hunting territories.8 6 It is un-
likely that these could have developed simply by means of a
convention based on possession. And this is true in spades for mod-
ern property systems like that of the common law, with multiple types
of possessory estates, future interests (contingent or not), servitudes,
restrictions on alienability, and so on (and on, and on). Complicated
80 See supra text accompanying notes 65-66.
81 MAYNARD SMITH, supra note 63, at 95.
82 See Alan Grafen, The Logic of Divisively Asymmetric Contests: Respect for Ownership and
the Desperado Effect, 35 ANIMAL BEHAV. 462, 463 (1987); see also MAYNARD SMITH, supra note
63, at 95 (stating that when v > c, "it is worth risking injury to gain the resource" and
"ownership will be ignored").
83 HUME, supra note 10, bk. 3, pt. 2, § 8, at 539.
84 There is some suggestion in the literature that third-party enforcement might de-
velop spontaneously under certain conditions, thanks to the appearance of punishers who
keep defectors in line. Models leading to this result can be found in BOWLES, supra note
18, at 381-90, and Christoph Hauert et al., Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly
Punishment, 316 Sci. 1905 (2007).
85 See supra text accompanying notes 76-77. It is worth noting that while a convention
of deference to possessors can account for only simple property rules, still the simple rules
can amount to the rights to exclude, use, and transfer, which are usually regarded as the
core elements of property. If there is a practice of deferring to possessors, that is
equivalent to saying that possessors are empowered to exclude, to use what they possess,
and to transfer their rights (the transferee becomes the new possessor and hence enjoys
deference). All of this follows especially if possession earns deference even when actual
constant physical possession is not required, on which see infra notes 92-93 and accompa-
nying text.
86 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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systems depend to a considerable degree on a process of intentional
design.
VII
We have considered two different ways to explain the evolution of
property rights. One way attributes property to intentional design,
the other to unintended consequences. Put side by side and com-
pared, the picture is pretty clear. The great advantage of the inten-
tional-design approach is that it can, in principle, account for the
creation and enforcement of property rights from alpha to omega, for
every detail of any property regime from the beginning right up to
now. The great disadvantages of the approach are that it entails the
difficult task of accounting for the origins and actions of the designer
and implies a degree of human rationality that probably had not yet
developed by the time the first primitive property rights emerged.
The unintended-consequences approach avoids these difficulties, 87
but at the price of two others. It copes poorly with the historic fact of
resource scarcity and cannot explain the development of complex
property systems.
Notice from this little summary how the strengths and weaknesses
of the two approaches match up. What the first approach does well,
the second does not; and what the second approach does well, the
first does not. This, to my mind, facilitates a fruitful combination of
the two approaches. I conclude with a sketch constructed in that fash-
ion, drawn in the context of a rough timeline of human evolution.
The move from primitive hominids to biologically modem
humans occurred by increments over millions of years, with the first
Homo probably branching off from its ancestors about three million
years B.P. 88 A surge of particularly rapid development began about
100,000 years B.P. and, it appears, only in the course of that period did
humans develop the capacity for language and abstract thinking.89 It
is more plausible, then, to suppose that property rights first emerged
among early humans as a product of deference to possession, rather
than as a product of design, simply because early humans probably
lacked the intellectual equipment essential to the design process.
87 Yet it has been largely ignored in the legal literature on the evolution of property
rights, seldom earning more than a nod, if that. The few exceptions to that generalization
have been noted in our discussion.
88 The abbreviation B.P., commonly used in evolutionary studies, refers to "before pre-
sent," where "present" is taken to be the year 1950. On the emergence of Homo, see, for
example, EDWARD 0. WILSON, SOCIOBOLOcV THE NEW SYNrHESIs 564-65 (25th anniv. ed.
2000).
89 See, e.g., id. at 564-69 (briefly discussing the literature); Jonathan Haidt et al., The
New Synthesis in Moral Psychology, 316 Sci. 998 (2007).
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During most of the last hundred millennia, humans lived as
hunter-gatherers. What anthropologists surmise about their modes of
social organization rests, in part, on backwards reasoning from the
behavior of various still-extant hunter-gatherer groups. Reliable gen-
eralizations about early property rights among hunter-gatherers are
consistent with the notion that the rights emerged as unintended con-
sequences; they attached to items severed (or fashioned) from the
common stock-gathered food, tools, weapons, and temporary habi-
tations. In contrast, land and its standing resource stock were re-
garded as communal for a very long time, 90 probably because the
hunter-gatherers' large foraging territories could not be unambigu-
ously possessed in the way that such items as tools and weapons could
be, and unambiguous possession was, of course, crucial to the asym-
metry needed to drive a convention of deference. 91
The status of land in the hunter-gatherer scheme eventually
changed from communal to individual ownership, for reasons tightly
tied to the invention of agriculture about 10,000 years ago. Effective
farming would have been a dicey proposition on communally owned
land because of shirking on the side of production and overconsump-
tion of the harvest-problems warded off by individual ownership of
separate plots. And just as individual ownership facilitated agricul-
ture, so agriculture facilitated individual ownership. Planting, tilling,
and harvesting had the effect of marking plots of land with unambigu-
ous signs of possession, thus providing the asymmetry crucial to defer-
ence. 92 A consequence is that rights based on possession could come
to be "permanent," rather than "transient," persisting even when own-
ers were not in continuous actual possession, provided there were
signs of ongoing ownership claims (recall again Demsetz's example of
Indians marking their hunting territories).93
90 See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 88, at 564-69. Koichi Kitanishi, Food Sharing Among the
Aka Hunter-Gatherers in Northeastern Congo, 25 AFR. STUDY MONOGRAPHS SUPPLEMENT 3, 5
(1998), states that "land and its resources were communally owned, whereas tools,
weapon[s] and procured food were owned individually in hunter-gatherer societies." Id.
(citation omitted). He adds, however, that "ownership" of food carried with it an obliga-
tion to share by way of obligatory gifts. See id. at 22-24.
91 See BOWLES, supra note 18, at 389-90. Recall Demsetz's mention of Indians mark-
ing their hunting territories (which were in fixed locations). See supra text accompanying
note 35. Elsewhere he notes that private rights in hunting territories would not be worth-
while in the case of grazing animals that roam over large tracts of land. Demsetz, supra
note 1, at 353.
92 See BOWLES, supra note 18, at 388-90. This "constructive possession" effect could
have reached beyond land to personal items, such as farming tools or crops stored on the
farm plot.
93 See supra text accompanying note 35. My reference to "permanent" and "transient"
property echoes the words of another classic figure in the literature on the development of
property rights. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *3-7. Blackstone used those
adjectives in stating his view of how property developed over time: First there was an open
commons; a commoner who took from it acquired "a kind of transient property" as to
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Coincident with the emergence and spread of agriculture, "popu-
lations increased enormously in density, and the primitive hunter-
gatherer bands gave way locally to the relentless growth of tribes,
chiefdoms, and states. ' 94 As suggested earlier, what seeded develop-
ments in the number and nature of governing authorities was proba-
bly the ability of small, close-knit groups to overcome collective action
problems. 95 The move from small organized groups to large, organ-
ized nation states worked through a process of aggregation by merger
and conquest (of populations and territories).96 Most likely, this con-
fluence of developments worked a shift in the world of property
rights, making their future largely a matter of social rather than natu-
ral engineering, of design rather than evolution. It is a good thing
that matters developed this way. Population growth spurred demand
for resources. The resulting higher resource values made new prop-
erty rights worthwhile-as Demsetz would put it, the benefits out-
weighed the costs entailed. At about the same time, happily enough,
new institutions appeared to design and enforce the rights. Enforce-
ment was particularly important because the very factor that stimu-
lated the development of new property rights, more valuable
resources, also threatened the stability of the old regime based on def-
erence. Property became worth fighting for (v > c). So design saved
us from moving back to the state of nature, at least so far.
Notwithstanding, what evolved early on continues to endure.
Possession, as any property lawyer knows, remains the cornerstone of
most contemporary property systems-nine points of the law, the root
of title, and the origin of property.97
which the "right of possession continued for the same time only that the act of possession
lasted." Id. at *3. Then, later, there developed "permanent" rights that did not depend on
constant physical possession. Id. at *4. These permanent rights were first in personal items
such as food and clothing. Eventually, though, land came to be treated in the same fash-
ion, coincident with the rise of agriculture. Id. at *5-7. Finally, the government entered
the picture to secure rights. Id. at *8.
So far as I am concerned, Blackstone's account was extraordinarily prescient, antici-
pating modern accounts (and not just mine) of the evolution of property rights by more
than two hundred years.
94 WILSON, supra note 88, at 569.
95 See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
96 See Robert L. Carneiro, A Theory of the Origin of the State, 169 Sc. 733 (1970) (elabo-
rating on circumscription theory as an explanation for the origin of a state).
97 See, e.g., Kingston-upon-Hull v. Horner, 98 Eng. Rep. 807, 815 (1774) (Lord Mans-
field observing: "Possession is very strong; rather more than nine points of the law."); Rich-
ard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REv. 1221 (1979); Carol M. Rose,
Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 73 (1985).
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